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I. General Considerations
After a third round of negotiations with its creditors, Argentina has
found no solution to its external debt problem.' This dragging situation,
which built up during the late 1970s and exploded shortly after Mexico's
crisis in 1982, involves several actors and reveals grave deficiencies in
the international monetary system. Until now it has been the debtor na-
tions that have shouldered the heaviest burden. 2 Creditor countries as
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I. See THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 26-Oct. 2, 1987, at 86. "The official estimate for 1987
interest payments of $4.4 billion is more than 6 percent of GDP and is at least five times
higher than the year's likely $800m trade surplus ..."; see also Latin American Debt-A
Creaking Edifice, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16-22, 1988, at 81.
2. For example, from 1981 to 1985, net resource transfers to Latin America were neg-
ative. During these critical years, more resources have been flowing out of these countries
than into them.
Latin America 1981-1985 Billions of Dollars
Interest repay-
Net Capital ments & foreign Net Resource
Year Inflow profits Transfer
1981 49.1 27.8 21.3
1982 27.6 36.8 -9.2
1983 6.1 34.9 -28.8
1984 11.6 37.1 -25.5
1985t 4.1 36.7 -32.6
tPreliminary
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well as the international financial institutions-public and private-should
join efforts and profit from this experience in order to find an effective
and positive solution. 3
This article reviews tWe development of the Argentina external debt,
as it was built up, its crisis, and the subsequent negotiations. This review
includes a description of some of the legal aspects involved and of the
network that currently links countries, banks, and international organi-
zations. Such interdependence demands new mechanisms that will allow
countries to secure payment to investors or lenders, while at the same
time enhancing their own economic development. 4
Certainly, the lack of the debtor countries' participation in those po-
litical decisions indirectly affecting the fluctuation of currencies used in
these transactions may constitute a legitimate claim for them. 5 Those
decisions affect the relationships between debtors and creditors. The al-
most complete lack of coordination within the international monetary
system, institutionally recognized by the international community since
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMER-
ICA, 1986 REPORT table 111-8, at 35.
3. See GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future Report of Eminent Persons on Problems
Facing the International Trading System, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC RELATIONS 1172 (J. Jackson ed. 2d ed.) [hereinafter J. JACKSON]; THE ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE WORLD IN 1988, at 81 (1988).
4. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 93 (1985); Barnett, Galvis, Gour-
aige, On Third World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83 (1984) [hereinafter Barnett]; Oechsli,
Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305, 314-15 (1981).
5. See Bryant, Eurocurrency Banking: Alarmist Concerns and Genuine Issues, I OECD
ECONOMIC STUDIES 20 (Autumn 1983). "Growth in Eurocurrency banking tends to under-
mine the autonomy of the national economy not because Eurocurrency deposits are non-
reservable or subject to less stringent regulation but because this growth represents a further
exposure of domestic economies to the global economy." Id. "In principle, any one of the
central banks would have power to influence the total volume of financial activity in the
whole structure most dependent on its currency unit and those intermediaries located within
national borders." Id. at 21. See also Larsen, International Economic Linkages, I OECD
ECONOMIC STUDIES 58 (Autumn 1983):
In the United States the combination of an expansionary fiscal policy and a
tight monetary policy has resulted in historically high nominal and real interest
rates which, in the framework of credible monetary policy and expectations
of continuing large deficits in the federal budget, have translated into favorable
expected yields on dollar assets and massive incipient capital inflows.
P. DRUCKER, CAMBIOS EN LA ECONOMiA MUNDIAL 28 (Centro de Estudios Comparados):
Los grandes paises han aprendido a utilizar la economia internacional de una
manera que no tiene precedentes para evitar enfrentar desagradables proble-
mas internos. Los Estados Unidos han utilizado las altas tasas de interes para
atraer capitales extranjeros y evitar abordar el deficit interno, Japon ha pro-
movido las exportaciones para mantener su nivel de empleo a pesar de una
economia interna estancada. Esta politizacion de la economia internacional es
ciertamente un factor que provoca la extrema volatilidad e inestabilidad de
los flujos de capital y los tipos de cambio.
(Emphasis added.) W. BRANSON, MACROECONOMICS 360. Barnett supra note 4, at 94;
M. BENJAOUI HACIA, UN NUEVO ORDEN ECONOMICO INTERNACIONAL 85 (UNESCO 1979);
see infra note 20.
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1973,6 adds an element of risk to these contracts, the allocation of which
may have not been adequately achieved. For instance, the recent deval-
uation of the U.S. dollar reduces the economic burden of debtor nations,
but at the same time imposes a burden on the world economy. The re-
sultant slowdown will affect the debtor nations' ability to attract invest-
ments in order to maintain their levels of production and the industrialized
nations' potential to sustain the present rate of increase of their imports
from less-developed countries.
I1. General Aspects 7
Factors common to the major debtors underlie the economic and fi-
nancial disturbances. Within the domestic factors, three major periods
can be outlined:
(i) From 1960 to 1974, the region's average economic growth moved
from 5.5 percent in 1961-1969 to 7.3 percent in 1970-1974, while
foreign debt service was kept at about 15 percent of current export
earnings. 8
(ii) From 1974 to 1980, great expansion in public and private con-
sumption expenditures was common. This, coupled with easy ac-
cess to international credit, served both the public and private
consumption patterns, and lead to their expansion and diversifi-
6. See C. COLLIARD, INSTITUTIONS DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 706 (1978); Alejo,
Villareal & Trejo Reyes, Economia y Comercio Internacional, DERECHO ECONIOMICO IN-
TERNACIONAL 66 (1976) [hereinafter Alejol; Suratgar, The International Financial System
and the Management of the International Debt Crisis, DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING 157
(D. Suratgar ed. 1984); Debs, The Development of International Equity Markets, 4 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 5, 6 (1986).
7. There is a framework used for Latin America as a whole that can be applied to
Argentina. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EXTERNAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA-BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS (1984).
8. A country's external debt is the result of the sum of the current account deficit and
net long-term capital inflow. See P. HALLWOOD, INTERNATIONAL MONEY-THEORY, EVI-
DENCE AND INSTITUTIONS 224; W. Branson, supra note 5, at 341:
The international balance of payments is divided into two major accounts. The
current account records income from the sale of currently produced goods
and of services.. . . The current account also records payment for the imports
of similar goods and services from abroad .... The second major account in
the balance of payments is the capital account. This account measures the
flow of funds [from the United States] to purchase assets from foreigners...
and the flow of funds [into the United States] as foreigners purchase assets
here....
See also KINDLERBERGER, ECONOMiA INTERNACIONAL 451; De La Dehesa, Institutional
Structure for External Debt Management, EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 88. Debt service
ratio is the relation "of a country's debt service (interest and repayment of maturing debt)
on public and publicly guaranteed debt to annual export earnings." P. HALLWOOD, supra
note 8, at 225. By the end of 1982, Argentine gross external debt was U.S. $38 billion, and
the debt service in 1983-as a percentage of exports-was 154 percent as to the total debt
and 88 percent excluding rollover of short-term debts. See Griffith-Jones, The Growth of
Multinational Banking, the Euro-currency Market and Their Effects on Developing Coun-
tries, in J. DEV. STUD., Jan. 1980, at 209:
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cation in most cases on the basis of policies of open trade and
financial liberalization. 9
(iii) Since 1981-1982, most countries have been forced into adjustment
programs to reduce private spending and public deficit and to re-
establish a balance of payment equilibrium or surplus, in order to
create conditions allowing them to pay back the loans. Even within
this last period, some differentiation should be made as a result
either of the content or of the procedure that the restructuring
agreements have followed. From 1981 to 1984, the trend was es-
sentially characterized by medium-term restructuring and the rear-
rangement of short-term debt. Since 1984, the techniques have
become more elaborate, the terms have been stretched, and the
role of the IMF has been enhanced. l°
As to the external factors, the increase of oil prices due to both oil
crises (1973-1974 and 1979-1980), the recessive economic trends in in-
dustrialized countries and the sharp increase in interest rates, both nom-
inal and real, during these years, have all had a considerable impact on
peripheral economies. I
The roll-over credit was created, based on a floating interest rate that varies ap-
proximately with the cost of the money for the lender, who obtains his funds on
the essentially short-term interbank market. Thus, although the loan to the de-
veloping country may have a long maturity (i.e., ten years), the interest rate is
changed every time the credit is rolled over (usually every three or six months).
See also D. LESSARD & J. WILLIAMSON. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION BEYOND THE DEBT
CRISIS 3 (1985); Barnett, supra note 4, at 89 n. 20: " 'Roll-over' is the process by which
banks, instead of demanding payment when a remittance of principal falls due, renew loans
and thus delay ultimate repayment. Banks do not, however, officially roll-over interest
payments, but they do convert these payments to new loans, with similar results."
9. Contracting external debt generally has the purpose of financing investment or, even-
tually, smoothing consumption in case of problems with supply and balance of payments.
See Dillon, External Debt and Economic Management: The Role of the International Mon-
etary Fund, EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 32 (H. Mehran ed.):
Properly used, borrowed external resources can greatly benefit a developing
country and contribute to its growth-they add to the total resources available
to an economy over a given period .... Such borrowing is desirable when it
is used to finance investment that is expected to yield an adequate rate of
return or to smooth consumption in the face of an uneven aggregate supply,
since it can provide a level of economic welfare that could not otherwise be
attained ....
See also Divisi6n de Desarrolio Econ6mico de la CEPAL, Politicas de Ajuste y Renego-
ciaci6n de la Deuda Externa en Latinoamerica, LA DEUDA EXTERNA LATINOAMERICANA
12 (A. Bianchi ed.) [hereinafter A. BIANCHI].
10. See Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Parity of Treatment between Equivalent
Creditors in Relation to Comparable Debts, 20 INT'L LAW. 857 (1986).
11. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 7; see also CAMARA DE
DIPUTADOS DE LA NACION, DIARIO DE SESIONES, Marzo 12 y 13 de 1986, at 7852. The
Secretary of Finance, Mr. Brodersohn, explained that the fall in the prices of the country's
most important exports had a substantial effect on its capacity of repayment. For example,
from 1984 to 1986 the price of wheat fell 32 percent, corn 28 percent, soybeans 25 percent,
and sorgum 20 percent.
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The importance of the role played by private bank loans in the financial
commitments of sovereign nations increased during the 1970s. After the
oil crisis and subsequent depression of the world economy, developing
countries needed resources to pay their outstanding debts. Those debts
could not be covered by exports, the prices of which had deteriorated. 12
On the other hand, money markets were suddenly flooded with the cur-
rency obtained by the OPEC countries due to the increase in oil prices. 13
Private bank lending to developing countries expanded during the first
three years of the decade at an annual average rate of 72 percent. 14 Some
of this expansion, probably a considerable amount of it, may be attributed
to the increase in Eurocurrency banking. Through this mechanism huge
sums of money accumulated after the rise of oil prices in 1973 were poured
into the market. "Eurobanking" has been described as that part of bank-
ing activity that leads to "the establishment of asset-liability relations
with foreigners and the denomination of obligations in external curren-
cies." ' 5 It is an aspect of the internationalization 16 of world finance that
has introduced new guidelines into international economics, forcing the
actors to find different forms of activity in order to compete in a broader
and more heterogeneous market. 17
The main characteristic of this Eurobanking system has been the sub-
stantial lack of government regulation. The rationales that traditionally
led governments to require certain standards from banks in order to ensure
financial stability within the countries were not applied to these activities
12. See CEPAL, supra note 9, at 5.
13. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 321 (1975) [hereinafter IMF
1975]. For a description of the "petromoney recycling" mechanism that took place during
the 1970s, see Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 210.
14. See Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 204, 207.
15. See P. HALLWOOD, supra note 8, at 190; Barnett, supra note 4, at 87-88; Bryant,
supra note 5, at 10; Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 206; Oechsli, supra note 4, at 304, 316.
16. For a concept of internationalization, see Debs, supra note 6, at 5.
17. See MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS I (Dec.
1986). It is useful to point out that during the last few years, trade in services has increased.
Notwithstanding the importance of goods in the current account balance of a country,
services are a major category. In the case of the United States, its service balance grants
a positive result, since the surplus reached in 1983 was almost $54 billion; see J. JACKSON,
supra note 3, at 835. It is very difficult to know the true range of this part of many countries'
economies, due to the lack of statistics. A particular reference must be made to the banking
activities in Latin America, which expanded notoriously during the 1970s. The importance
of this sector in a nation's economy is a result not so much of its incidence on the GNP,
but rather of its strategic position, since it can help to enhance development; it also controls
the tools that link the country with the rest of the world's economy. Traditionally, banking
activity had been severely controlled by the government in most Latin American countries.
During the 1970s, however, more international financial presence in local markets was
permitted, and foreign banks established offices. According to some research, during these
years a negative trend that began in these economies found its easiest way of operating in
the banks in the form of capital flights. See SELA, Los SERVICIOS Y EL DESARROLLo DE
AMERICA LATINA 59.
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and all contracts were made on a nearly pure "free-market" basis. Trans-
actions usually did not receive the guaranty of the State as a lender-of-
last-resort, mainly because its currency was not involved. 18 According
to Stephany Griffith-Jones, "this rapid growth of multinational banking
is to a great extent attributable to the asymmetry between the stringent
and detailed official regulations governing residents operating their own
national currencies, and the great freedom of nonresidents to operate in
foreign currencies from the same constrained national banking system." 19
The risks that this activity created are demonstrated through the anal-
ysis of our case. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that the as-
sumptions germane in the international regulatory system (Bretton Woods)
were not enough to build tools into the system to cope with many of the
problems that occurred during the 1970s and the 1980s.
20
This large-scale credit system was used mainly by developing countries.
They did not qualify as "first-class borrowers" and, therefore, could not
initially take advantage of the international bond market with its fixed
interest rates.
Another expanding feature of these private loans was their being granted
at variable interest rates, 21 based either on LIBOR or PRIME rate. The
legal effect of this "variability" is to transfer the risks of the market to
the borrower, 22 and eventually to increase the cost of servicing debt.
During the 1970s, the IMF anticipated the negative effects that a "swing"
in the rates would have, especially in the Latin American region. The
interest rates, however, were remarkably low during those initial years,
and indebtedness grew. 23 In the case of Argentina, 57.7 percent of its
loans were under these terms by 1980.24
18. See MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, supra note 17, at 4-5, 6. For a discussion
of "lender-of-last-resort policy" and international banking, see Bryant, supra note 5, at 22.
19. See Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 205. A sensible proposal has been put forward
by the Bank for International Settlements concerning capital standards. The aim of such a
proposal is to create a uniform set of rules under which the banks of major industrialized
nations would compete. A relevant aspect of the plan is that a minimum 8 percent capital-
risk assets ratio is envisaged. This is a considerable enlargement, if one takes into account
that the average equity-to-assets ratio of main American banks is only 3.23 percent. See
Levelling, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12-18, 1987, at 92.
20. See Suratgar, supra note 6, at 154-55; see also MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY,
,supra note 17, at 8, where it points out that the first moves to counteract excessively risky
positions were taken by the banks. Further, "[the international monetary system displays
a persistent asymmetry, assigning deficit countries the main burden of achieving external
payments adjustment. . . .Thus the outstanding issue for the international monetary system
remains how best to assure that surplus and deficit countries share trade and current account
adjustment burdens." Id. at II.
21. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 359 (1976) [hereinafter IMF
1976].
22. See Debs, supra note 6, at 8; Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 207.
23. See WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 112; Barnett, supra note 4, at 92, 94; Suratgar,
supra note 20, at 152.
24. Barnett, supra note 4, at 94 n. 53.
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The increase in the number of banks-financially capable or not-lend-
ing to countries (although large banks had a competitive advantage during
the first years25) led to consequences felt by the debtor countries today.
Since it was assumed that sovereign debtors would not default, 26 lending
to them was conceived as a perfect business. 27 A country's credit-
worthiness was, in several cases, considered only superficially by the
banks, 28 and "conditionality"-the rule in dealings with official lenders-
was not a requirement in order for developing countries to gain access to
these sources of funds. 29 Some authors specifically address the issue of
"bank responsibility," stating that the governments should require private
banks to internalize the costs of imprudent lending as a condition for a
reform of the renegotiations on foreign debt.30
II1. 1973-1982: Building the Debt
In 1973 Argentina's debt service payments amounted to 18.3 percent
of its export of goods and nonfactor services. 31 A report published by
25. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY SUPPLEMENT 179 (1977) [here-
inafter IMF 1977]. On the other hand, once "syndicated loans" became usual, large banks
also had advantages. They "managed" the negotiations and charged smaller banks an
important "fee," since the smaller banks wanted to participate in the market, but were
unable to handle the negotiations themselves. See CEPAL, supra note 9, at 13; Griffith-
Jones, supra note 8, at 209 n. 16; Oechsli, supra note 4, at 311.
26. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 84.
27. And it has probably been one. Even after the crisis began, the banks, especially the
U.S. banks, have made enormous profits. According to the information cited supra in
note 2, "in 1986, the bank [Citicorp] earned $257m, or about 24 percent of its total income,
on loans to countries in the Caribbean and in Central and South America." Citicorp's
exposure in Argentina is U.S. $1.5 billion. Its total loans outstanding in Latin America are
U.S. $14.8 billion. All Third World commitment, however, amounts only to about 10 percent
of the bank's loan portfolio.
The measure adopted by Citicorp reflects a more realistic approach to the problem. But
it hides its dangers, since if it is followed by all major creditors, it will reduce the amount
of new money lent to the lesser developed countries, and create risky situations on the
political side. The much-questioned Baker plan would completely fail if this were to happen.
See Barnett, supra note 4, at 90.
28. See Griffith-Jones, supra note 8, at 210.
29. See id. at 209. It is very interesting to observe how, once the crisis started, "con-
ditionality" extended its presence, and currently most negotiations with private creditors
require a previous approval by the IMF, which necessarily means accepting "conditions."
30. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 132, where the authors explain that since the incorrect
action was that taken by the banks, the fact of shifting to the debtor countries the costs of
those irresponsible practices is a "Market Failure," and governments should avoid allowing
the situation to advance to the point of default, which is much more difficult to handle. See
also Sachs, Managing LDC Debt Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 419 (No.
2, 1986).
31. See IMF 1975, supra note 13, at 324. It is useful to compare statistics in order to
observe the evolution of Latin American debt.
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the World Bank 32 revealed that Argentine external public debt outstanding
as of December 31, 1974, had the following characteristics:








Service Payments as % of exports of
goods and nonfactor services 16.2
Argentina was already included within the group of eleven countries that
accounted for 72% of the debt of developing countries to private financial
institutions by the end of that year.33 As of December 1975, the Argentine
outstanding public external debt amounted to U.S. $4,698.5 million. 34
TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING (in Billions of U.S. $)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
BRA. 13.8 18.9 23.3 28.6 35.2 48.3 57.4 66.1 65.7 88.2 96.5 102
MEX. 8.6 12.8 16.9 21.8 27.1 33.6 40.8 53.8 67.0 82.0 90.0 96
ARG. 6.4 8.0 7.9 8.3 9.7 12.5 19.0 23.2 35.7 38.0 45.5 48
VEN. 4.6 5.3 5.7 8.7 12.3 16.3 23.7 27.5 29.3 31.3 33.5 34
The data were obtained from Szapire, Deuda Externa de los Paises en Desarrollo, 3 CON-
TRIBUCIONES 25 (1985),
32. See IMF 1976, supra note 21, at 293.
33. See id. at 358. Flows of capital towards developing countries may come from the
official sector, containing direct channels for capital flow such as bilateral aid, and from
intermediaries, predominantly international or multilateral organizations, such as the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Argentina decided to become a member
of both institutions in 1956. See Decreto Ley 15970, 31 de Agosto de 1956, in xvi-A ANALES
DE LEGISLACI6N ARGENTINA 843 (B.O. 12/IX/56) [hereinafter ADLA]. The role of these
institutions, however, has adopted particular characteristics since 1982, which is analyzed
later. Such particularity does not allow us to include them within the general category of
creditors. Capital may also come from the private sector, which has direct mechanisms,
predominantly direct investments, as well as intermediaries, represented by the commercial
banks and the market of international bonds and other sec rities. See WORLD BANK, supra
note 4, at 85. These latter, after increasing their participaton so that by 1982 commercial
banks were creditors of 82 percent of the total external debt of Latin America, have sig-
nificantly retracted as a consequence of the crisis that began i.I 1982. Since then commercial
bank lending has been organized mainly through rescheduling and refinancing agreements,
altering the previous trend. See Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter
in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145 (1984).
34. See IMF 1977, supra note 25, at 284.
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In -1976, due to a balance of payment deficit, Argentina was awarded
Compensatory Financing by the IMF in the amount of SDR 110 million. 35
That same year, a "standby" agreement was approved by the Fund "in
support of the government's financial program adopted in April 1976."36
In October 1977, a new "standby" agreement was approved that au-
thorized the purchase over the subsequent twelve months of SDR 159.5
million in order to support a program aimed at strengthening the balance
of payments and reducing inflation. As of December 31, 1977, outstanding
bank claims against Argentina amounted to U.S. $4,863 million. 37 At that
time Argentina's quota in the IMF remained at SDR 440 million and its
net purchases totaled the equivalent of SDR 565.6 million. 38
In 1978 the Second Amendment to the Fund's Articles of Agreement
came into force and Argentina's quota increased to SDR 535 million. That
amounted, however, to a reduction of 0.14 percent. 39
International lending expanded until 1980.40 Only then did the inter-
national community begin to realize the enormity of the problem it had
created during the 1970s. Nevertheless, the issue was still understood as
being a consequence of short-term imbalances of the balance of pay-
ments. 41 The process of multilateral debt renegotiations began once the
crisis was openly revealed, anticipating what was to become a common
practice after 1982. The combination of the roles of the commercial banks
and the IMF began to accentuate itself. During 1981 and 1982, the Ar-
gentine Government assumed U.S. $9,600 million of private debt, under
the regime of "exchange insurance contracts" and U.S. $1,400 million
under swaps arranged by Banco Central. 42 From then on, renegotiations
35. See IMF 1976, supra note 21, at 101.
36. See id. at 252.
37. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 263 (1978) [hereinafter IMF
1978].
38. See IMF 1976, supra note 21, at 323.
39. See IMF 1978, supra note 37, at 106.
40. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 2 (1981) [hereinafter IMF 1981].
41. Id. at 187.
42. From 1976 onwards, the policy of the government sought and achieved the liberali-
zation of the exchange rates and payments system. With the purpose of reducing inflation
and adjusting the balance of payments, a policy of complete opening of the national economy
in its commercial and financial spheres was possible due to the constant inflow of capital.
The private sector, therefore, was able to contract loans in foreign currency. Many inter-
national banks established themselves in Argentina, and both those branches as well as local
banks could lend foreign currency to local borrowers. After 1981, however, the government
had to devaluate local currency, and restrictions were imposed on the financial market,
limiting the sale of badly needed foreign currency. To avoid the bankruptcy of the industrial
sector, special regimes were created by means of which a debtor of loans in foreign currency
entered into a contract with Banco Central, which amounted to a future sale of foreign
currency by that institution at a fixed price, not affected by future devaluations. Since at
the time of performance Banco Central did not have enough currency to pay, bonds were
issued. As a consequence, the state assumed the private sector debt under new terms (Act
No. 22749). See CEPAL, supra note 9, at 16; J. RIVA, OPERATORIA BANCARIA EN COMERCIO
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included private debt as part of the public external debt. 43 By the end of
1982, Argentina's public external debt had reached U.S. $27,474 million. 44
IV. The Debt Crisis: Its Origins
There are several differing views as to the nature of the debt crisis.
Some authors regard the problem as one of liquidity, "a temporary short-
age of foreign funds with which to serve international debts." 45 The so-
lution, according to this point of view, is to increase public international
funding of the Third World debt. Within this perspective, the Baker Plan
is perhaps the most relevant and well-known proposal coming from a
government. 46
As Geoffrey Sachs explains:
[Under the plan, the commercial banks were encouraged to make new loans
to the heavily indebted countries, specifically $20 billion of increased exposure
EXTERIOR Y CAMBIOS--ASPECTOS JURIDICOS 114, 410 (1986); Cambiaso y Legon, Caracteres
y Circulacidn de los BONODS y PROMISSORY NOTES, 17 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COM-
ERCIAL Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 607.
43. Initially the participation of public debtors in the total share of the debt decreased.
When the crisis was unavoidable, pressure was put on debtor governments to guarantee
national private debt. Creditors therefore could rely on the existence of an additional debtor,
the state, the solvency of which was traditionally undoubted. The current managing director
of the IMF, M. Camdessus, has an interesting and realistic approach to the analysis of the
debtors and the circumstances in which they went into huge borrowing. His description
clearly emphasizes bankers' participation in the building up of the debts, and the difference
between serious governments and "military dictatorships, and regimes of that type [who]
are known to ignore financial and monetary concerns." Camdessus, Governmental Creditors
and the Role of the Paris Club, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, supra note 6, at 125. As
to the linkages between public and private sector debt, see Mudge, Restructuring Private
and Public Sector Debt: Country Debt Structure?, 20 INT'L LAW. 847 (1986). As a conse-
quence, once restructuring agreements began no major distinctions were made between
both kinds of debt, and "the payment of private sector foreign currency debt becomes the
responsibility of the sovereign as a practical matter if not a legal one." See Mudge, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring: A Current Perspective, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, supra
note 6, at 88.
44. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 27 (1984) [hereinafter IMF
1984].
45. See P. HALLWOOD, supra note 8, at 237; Barnett, supra note 4, at 84 n.4. This has
been the traditional approach to the balance of payment deficit, the basis of the Bretton
Woods system for some authors. See Alejo, supra note 6, at 67; R. PLAN, EXTERNAL DEBT
RESCHEDULING 12 (1985), who explains why the banks support this approach and the
"advantages" it has for them.
46. During the initial stage of the problem, this was probably the most influential thesis.
The mechanisms used to combat this short-term insolvency were essentially two:
(I) renegotiations with the banks and access to the international financial network prepared
to cope with immediate shortages of funds (International Bank of Payments, Commodity
Credit corporation, the U.S. Treasury); and (2) the central banks of most industrialized
nations, which implicitly accepted acting as lenders-of-last-resort, even though with im-
portant reservations, so as to avoid enhancing this aspect of banking activity. See Guerguil,
La Crisis Financiera Internacional: Diagnosis y Prescripciones, in A. BIANCHI, supra
note 9, at 260.
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over three years, while the multilateral lending institutions were called upon to
make $9 billion of new loans in return for policy adjustments in the debtor
countries. The debtor countries were expected to continue to meet interest
obligations on a timely basis. 47
Another point of view regards the problem as one of long-term solvency,
being directly related to the enhancement of the industrialized nations'
economic growth. 48 Without any economic growth in the OECD nations,
the Third World countries would not increase their exports, therefore the
problem would need a different solution. According to some of these
authors, improving the developing countries' conditions would require
creating an international mechanism that would enable the debtors to
''swap" the original debts owed to private banks for long-term bonds
issued by the countries and guaranteed by an international organization.
The claimed advantage of this hypothesis is that it was a more realistic
approach. The debt could be transferred to the international organization
not at its face value but rather at a lower amount, forcing the banks to
write these assets (Third World countries' debts) off their books. The
banks would then replace the assets with bonds issued by the international
organization. 49
The third point of view is that the problem is one of the exchange rate
monetary system. Since the monetary system no longer has a fixed stan-
dard, these authors believe that the value of each currency depends strictly
upon political decisions, such as those taken by the Central Bank au-
thorities of each nation where currency is used in international finance. 50
What we may now find, therefore, could be described as the result of
political management of monetary policies in which the Eurobanking com-
munity funneled funds from industrialized to developing countries without
taking into account the creditworthiness of the borrowers. 51 The debtor
nations relied on international inflation (during the 1970s inflation effec-
tively made interest rates negative), trusting that these debts could be
paid off without much sacrifice. 52 This assumption proved partially wrong,
particularly during the first years of the 1980s. It is, however, still a
possibility that should not be disregarded, due to the recent decline of
47. See Sachs, supra note 30, at 401.
48. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 21 (1987) [hereinafter IMF
1987] (opinions of Mr. Volcker, Mr. Schlesinger, and Mr. Rimmer de Vries); see also R.
PLAN, supra note 45, at 10.
49. See Guerguil, supra note 46, at 272.
50. See Larsen, supra note 5, at 58. This was the reasoning followed in several oil-
importing countries that had borrowed in order to pay their bills for imports needed after
the second oil crisis (1979) and intended to turn large deficits into surpluses. The mechanisms
used were essentially "stiffened import controls" and "currency devaluations." See MOR-
GAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 3 (Sept. 1986).
51. See P. HALLWOOD, supra note 8, at 237-38.
52. For an analysis of this point of view, see Ramos, Politicas de Estabilizaci6n y Ajuste
en el Cono Sur, 1974-1983, in A. BIANCHI, supra note 9. at 219.
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the U.S. dollar, the currency in which a majority of the debts are
outstanding.
V. The Crisis: From 1982 to the Present
Once default appeared an imminent threat to world finance, the major
actors adopted distinctive roles in the negotiations. Perhaps the most
interesting and important role has been that played by the International
Monetary Fund.
Robichek has pointed out that the IMF's role as an "honest broker"
called for the performance of three major tasks:
The first is to help a country frame an adjustment program that would qualify
it for a standby or extended arrangement with the IMF. This task involves the
prudent exercise of conditionality. The second is to commit IMF resources in
support of such an adjustment program, which involves setting the IMF's own
contribution toward financing a country's balance of payment deficit. In setting
its own contribution, the IMF takes into account the enhanced leverage which
this commitment of its own resources affords the country with other foreign
lenders and, more particularly, with the banks with exposures in the country.
Third, the IMF intercedes directly in support of the country's efforts for raising
external finance from third parties. This task is commonly referred to as its
catalytic role. 53
Most negotiations bypass the IMF. Generally, an agreement between
the debtor and the Fund appears as a sine qua non of any settlement of
external debt complications. This does not imply a consensus as to the
way in which the IMF performs its tasks, for this remains one of the most
debated topics. 54
In January 1983, an agreement was approved between the IMF and
Argentina, entitling that country to use SDR 2,020 million of IMF re-
sources. SDR 1,500 million were granted under a 15-month "standby"
arrangement in support of a government economic recovery program, and
SDR 520.1 million were made available under the Compensatory Financ-
ing Facility. The first would be financed partially from the Fund's ordinary
resources (SDR 745.7 million) and, in part, from resources borrowed by
the Fund (SDR 754.3 million). The "Facility" was granted due to shortfalls
recorded in total export earnings during 1982. 55
53. Robichek, supra note 33, at 146.
54. As to the role of the IMF, see Nowzad, The Role of the IMF in Rescheduling Inter-
national Debt, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, supra note 6, at 131; Dillon, supra
note 9, at 31; Ground, Los Programas Economicas de Ajuste en America Latina, in A.
BIANCHI, supra note 46, at 157; Conklin, The IMF and Economic and Social Human Rights:
A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, in HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY; R. PLAN, SUpra
note 45, at 39.
55. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 38 (1983) [hereinafter IMF
1983].
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The Argentine Government imposed a stern economic adjustment pro-
gram in order to reduce inflation and public deficit, while at the same time
increasing exports and tax collections. The balance of payments deficit
was supposed to be lowered from almost U.S. $6.2 billion (1982) to U.S.
$500 million in fifteen months. Almost simultaneously, a short-term credit
bridge loan for U.S. $1.1 billion was obtained from commercial banks. It
was to be paid back during 1983 with assets obtained from the IMF.
Medium-term loans for U.S. $1.5 billion were also negotiated, and prin-
ciples that were to govern rescheduling of debt service payments due in
1983 were agreed upon with the creditors. 56 In June 1983, Argentina
planned renegotiation of its debt with the private banks on these terms: 57
Basis Amount Grace Payment Spread
Agreed Period Due (on
(U.S. (years) (years) LIBOR/
$/million) PRIME)
-Arrears up to the 100% 3 7 2-V8 to 2
end of '82 ppal. 7000
-Vanquishments 100% 3 7 2-/8 to 2
in 1983 ppal.
-New Credit Med. new 1500 3 4.5 2-1/4 to
term '83 financing 2-1/8
Bridge loan 1100 7 14 1-5/8 to
(months) (months) I-'2
The agreement was never signed, 58 and negotiations with the government
were interrupted until the constitutional authorities were elected on Oc-
tober 30, 1983.
In his message delivered in Neufchatel, Switzerland, M. de Laroisiere,
analyzing the effects of the debt crisis, said: "[F]or the meantime, it will
be important to see that an indiscriminate or abrupt retrenchment of bank
lending is avoided. If this were to occur, it would force adjustment...
on a scale and in a time frame disruptive ... to creditors and debtors
56. Id. at 39.
57. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 36-37 (1986) [hereinafter IMF
1986].
58. CEPAL, NOTAS SOBRE LA ECONOMIA Y EL DESARROLLO, No 424/425, Diciembre
de 1985, at 18.
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alike." 59 As we shall see, this "retrenchment" did occur, and the debt
crisis was enhanced.
During most of this period, the main objective of the IMF was directed
toward achieving adjustment policies in the debtor nations. It was ex-
pected that "the debtor countries themselves [must] demonstrate that
they are taking the necessary steps to regain financial viability, while
preserving their capacity to resume economic growth in the medium
term." 60
By the beginning of 1984, the debt renegotiation process between debt-
ors and creditors increased. A significant number of countries found them-
selves in the need of rescheduling, and both debtors and creditors were
gaining experience. It was alarming to observe that in a period of seven
years, from 1974 to1981, debt service ratio in Latin America passed from
28 percent to 42 percent. 61
The Alfonsin administration, elected in 1983, expected to receive more
lenient treatment by the IMF and the banks, and was reluctant to increase
economic adjustment. The target was to reach an agreement with the
banks without any previous arrangement with the Fund. When the admin-
istration came into power on December 10, 1983, arrears amounted to
U.S. $3.2 billion, plus U.S. $1.1 billion of arrears for "nationalized"
private debt, and a current account deficit estimated at U.S. $2.3 billion
for 1984.62
In March 1984, a rescue program in the amount of U.S. $600 million
was arranged between four Latin American governments and the banks
in order to avert what appeared to be an otherwise unavoidable default
by Argentina on its commercial bank payments. The Federal Reserve
intervened as guarantor for Argentina, who agreed to begin serious ne-
gotiations with the IMF for a standby agreement. These proved very
difficult, and several Letters of Intent presented by the Argentine Gov-
ernment were rejected.
On December 28, 1984, Argentina reached a new fifteen-month stand-
by agreement with the IMF for a total of SDR 1,419 million to be paid in
six installments of SDR 236.5 million each.
During 1984-1985, Argentina entered its third round of negotiations
with the banks, and new terms were reached: 63
59. See IMF 1983, supra note 55, at 73.
60. Id. at 381; M. de Laroisiere, Message to the American Enterprise Institute, Wash-
ington, D.C., Dec. 5th, 1983.
61. See IMF 1984, supra note 44, at 26.
62. See Garcia & Junco, Historia de la Renegociaci6n de la Deuda Externa Argentina,
BOLETIN INFORMATIVO TECHINT-ENERO, No. 245, Febrero 1987, at 42.
63. See IMF 1986, supra note 57, at 38.
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Years of Spread Years Comm.
U.S. $/ payment- over
(million) new cred. LIBOR (total) (grace)
Amort.
resched. 13,900 1982-85 1.38 12 3
New
Credits 4,200 1985 1.63 10 3 0.63
In June 1985, a drastic turn in economic policy was implemented by
the Argentine Government (the Austral Plan), which received the support
of the IMF.64 This plan paved the way for renegotiation and rescheduling
with the eleven members of the Steering Committee, chaired by Mr.
William Rhodes of Citibank. By the end of the year, the Argentine external
debt amounted to U.S. $48.7 billion. 6 5
In a meeting that took place in Buenos Aires in March 1986, the Group
of 24 on International Monetary Affairs66 issued a press communique that
contained several noteworthy aspects. The debt problem was clearly ac-
knowledged as predominately economic. It was recognized as not an
isolated problem but one linked to the other economic problems of the
international community. The success of a possible solution necessarily
would require an increase of productivity in the debtor and creditor na-
tions. However, the combined action of debtor and creditor nations should
be the adequate response to this problem. Political aspects do affect world
trade and political action must be adopted. 67 The role of the IMF, there-
64. One of the most debated topics in countries such as Argentina is whether the IMF
exercises influence over the economic authorities exceeding what the more nationalistic
parties consider appropriate. The "adjustment plans" traditionally recommended by the
IMF are strongly criticized in the Southern hemisphere. As to the "Austral Plan" adopted
by the Argentine authorities in June 1985, its main aspects were explained in a Congress
session by Mr. Machinea, current president of Banco Central, then Adjunct Secretary of
Political Economy. According to his remarks, this plan did not respond to the "'Pollack
model" because its three cornerstones were: (1) the freezing of prices, wages, exchange
rates, and tariffs; (2) the reduction of the fiscal deficit; and (3) a monetary reform. See
CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACION, DIARIO DE SESIONES, reunion 41, at 7849.
65. See CAMARA DE DiPUTADOS, DIARIO DE SESIONES, Marzo 12 y 13, 1986, at 7851.
66. The Group of 24 was created in 1972, with the aim of unifying the positions of
developing nations concerning monetary affairs, discussed principally at the IMF. It has
produced three important documents concerning the improvement and reform of the inter-
national monetary system, the last one in Seoul, in October 1985. See E. Zalduendo, Brief
History of the Group of Twenty Four, in G-24; DOCUMENTS Or THE G-24 (1972-1986) (1986).
67. See IMF 1986, supra note 57, at 90-91. There have been several arguments as to
whether the solution to the LDCs' external debt will be essentially economic or, on the
contrary, a result of a political decision of the industrialized nations. Certainly, most debtor
nations have insisted in claiming from creditor governments responses that are not strictly
tied to economic models, or that rely on "free market" principles, to achieve economic
growth in debtor countries. Also within the creditor nations, public officials have sometimes
expressed their views as to favoring a "political solution" to the problem. However, the
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fore, was severely scrutinized in order to establish whether potentially
available mechanisms had been utilized. 68
The ministers insisted that a constant flow of credit to these countries
was necessary in order to maintain production and enhance investment
and thereby make debt payments possible. 69 The communique empha-
sized the close relationship between debtors, the IMF, and the private
banks, as well as the need of a group effort to solve the problem.
VI. New Trends: The 1986-1987 Round of Negotiations
After the launching of the Austral Plan, the Argentine Government
began communications with the IMF and the banks in order to obtain
better financial conditions for the country's debt payments. By the be-
ginning of 1987, the terms of a new stand-by agreement with the Fund
were being discussed, while at the same time banks were consulted to
determine the amount of new money that could be obtained under the
"forced lending" mechanisms that are presently common. On July 23,
1987, the IMF approved an arrangement for SDR 1,113 million. 70
The agreement reached in April 1987 between Argentina and the banks
has the following characteristics:
U.S. $/ Years of Spread Years Comm.
(mill.) payment over
resched. LIBOR (total) (grace)
Amort. 25,300 19 7
1982-86 13/16%
Resched. 4,200 12 5
New 1,950 7/8% 12 5
Credit --------- ---- over 1,500 -------
(comm. credit) (400) 13/16% 4
financial community, the IMF, and the governments have insisted on reaching solutions
without disregarding market conditions. See MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, supra
note 50, at 2; Segal & Pinto, Inviabilidad del Cobro Compulsivo de las Deudas de on Estado
par Otro y la Moral Econ6mica Internacional, LA LEY, t. 1984-C, at 1227; Barnett, supra
note 4, at 116 (the authors suggest the possibility of establishing a "claims settlement"
mechanism similar to the one created for the US-Iran conflict); id. at 134-35; R. PLAN supra
note 45, at 24 (the author makes reference to the Mar del Plata meeting (Sept. '84), where
eleven Latin American debtor nations consolidated the position adopted in Cartagena,
expressing themselves in favor of a political dialogue with the OECD countries on the debt
issue).
68. See IMF 1986, supra note 57, at 92.
69. See id.
70. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY 233 (1987) [hereinafter IMF
1987].
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This agreement has both rescheduling and refinancing aspects. 7 1 It reg-
ulates the Argentine Public Sector Borrowers' debt and establishes prin-
ciples that will apply to the Argentine Private Sector Borrowers' debt as
well.
A. RESCHEDULING
As to the Public Sector, the agreement covers all maturities of Specified
Debt originally falling due on or after January 1, 1986. This includes "the
principal maturities of Debt of Argentine Public Sector Borrowers (i)
refinanced under the 1985 Refinancing Agreement and similar agreements
and (ii) originally falling due or rescheduled to fall due on or after
January 1, 1986,"72 and other defined debt that has to be refinanced on
the basis of similar principles.
The 1987 Agreement is a restatement and amendment of the 1985 Re-
financing Agreement. The agreement contains substantially the same terms
and conditions for each Argentine Public Sector Borrower (defined as
obligor in the contract), the republic of Argentina as guarantor, Banco
Central de la Republica Argentina, and the bank creditors.
The agreement affects currencies in that debt outstanding in European
currencies, Yen, Canadian, and U.S. dollars will be refinanced in the
original currency. Debt in other currencies will be redenominated into
71. The lack of a "procedure" has been a traditional difficulty in sovereign nations' debt
rescheduling. Negotiations were traditionally dispersive, increasing costs and economic
burden. See Suratgar, supra note 20, at 155:
No mechanism exists under international law for putting a sovereign borrower
into effective quarantine from its creditors, thus allowing time for a reorgan-
ization of its financial affairs with a view to ensuring that creditors receive
equitable treatment consistent with its economy in an orderly way and in due
course repay its creditors.
See also Oechsli, supra note 4, at 307. Several terms have been used. In a broad sense,
"renegotiation" is used to encompass any kind of dealing between a debtor unwilling to
default and his creditor. If a rearrangement of maturities and interest rates is designed for
the debts included within the consolidation period, so that payments will be made according
to a new deferred schedule, authors speak of "rescheduling." Instead, if creditors compro-
mise new funds that permit timely performance by the debtor, this is denominated "refi-
nancing," which "has the advantage of allowing the creditor banks to continue classifying
all the old and new assets as 'performing loans'." R. PLAN, supra note 45, at 26; see Mudge,
supra note 43, at 87. Recently, some consideration has been granted to a different category,
"debt relief," which "signifies any arrangement such as below-market interest rates, for-
giveness of principal, or repurchase of debts by the debtor country at below par, that reduces
the present value of contractual obligations of the debtor country." Sachs, supra note 30,
at 398. The general rule elaborated is that each sovereign's situation has to be dealt with
on a case-by-case analysis, since the terms of the renegotiation will need to be implemented
taking into account the particular circumstances each country faces. See R. PLAN, supra
note 45, at 53; Barnett, supra note 4, at 83; Camdessus, supra note 43, at 125; CEPAL,
Politicas de Ajuste y Renegociaci6n de la Deuda Externa en Latinoamerica, in A. BIANCHI,
supra note 49, at 81; Mudge, supra note 43, at 86; Oechsli, supra note 4, at 308; Trichet,
Official Debt Rescheduling, in EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 127.
72. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: 1987 FINANCING PLAN PART V-D-I I.
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U.S. dollars. For the first group, however, a mechanism that "switches
to home currency" has been included. That mechanism specifies the amount
of debt eligible for currency switch and the timing (each interest payment
data occurring during the two and one-half years following a currency
switch election).
The essential terms of the 1987 agreement are:
(1) maturities originally refinanced under the 1985 Agreement will be
repaid in twenty-five semi-annual installments commencing on
May 2, 1994, and ending on May 2, 2006;
(2) maturities originally due or scheduled to fall due on or after
January 1, 1986, will be similarly repaid in twenty-five semi-annual
installments commencing on May 2, 2006.
A fixed schedule contains the percentage of amortization to be paid in
each installment as determined (from 1 percent to 7.50 percent). As for
the interest rates, the average for the 3-6 months U.S. dollar deposit
LIBOR or the Domestic Rate (either secondary market 90-180-day, or
certificates of deposit) are the only options available, and the spread is
13-16 percent per annum over both of them. PRIME is not included. A
special clause links this agreement between Argentina and the commercial
banks to the Argentine-IMF agreement. By the time the first amortization
payment is made, Argentina agrees to have in effect an IMF program, or
at least to allow enhanced IMF surveillance. This agreement is governed
by New York law, and included in the agreement is a clause giving non-
exclusive jurisdiction to the New York courts and an express waiver of
sovereign immunity by Argentina.
B. REFINANCING
New loans are made under a "Credit Agreement" for U.S. $1.55 billion
and a "Credit and Deposit Facility" for U.S. $400 million. Banks may
opt for "New Money Instruments" (NMI) up to a maximum subscription
of U.S. $1 million each in lieu of all or part of the commitments under
the new money facilities. The issuance and transfer of NMI securities are
subject to compliance with applicable securities laws (New York law),
including the United States Securities Act of 1933.
NMIs will be transferable to "Eligible Institutional Investors." This
arrangement allows small lenders to end their contractual relationships
with Argentina by transferrng the NMIs.
The First Facility is a nonrevolving, multicurrency, floating and fixed-
rate term loan agreement with multiple disbursements linked to IMF dis-
bursements, IBRD agreements, and disbursement levels from official
sources. It contains an Investment Fund of U.S. $350 million, that covers
medium-term lending for investment projects having a minimum term of
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six years (including a four-year grace period) which must be coupled with
"new funds" or "other funds" provided to an Argentine Entity.
The lenders for this Facility are a syndicate of all non-Argentine financial
institutions with non-Argentine currency outstanding, those that have de-
posits with all Argentine Public and Private Sector Borrowers, or those
that own securities (bonds, treasury bills, notes, and certificates of de-
posit) of, or have loaned money to, the foreign agencies and branches of
banks currently owned by Argentina. These lenders will participate on a
prorata basis. The credit will be available in five installments, which will
match the drawdown dates under the 1987 IMF stand-by arrangement.
This agreement, however, is subject to a number of conditions, such
as the existence of disbursements from official creditors the agreements
with the Paris Club, disbursements from the IMF Compensatory Financ-
ing Facility and at least U.S. $100 million from the World Bank. These
conditions must be satisfied for the first installment and similar conditions
must exist for the other four installments. Obviously, the role of the IMF
is influential, since a general reliance on the performance criteria it es-
tablishes underlies all the agreements.
The interest rates available to lenders are the LIBOR and the Domestic
Rates previously described, with a spread of 7-8 percent per annum in
both cases. Maturity begins on October 25, 1992, and repayment is to be
made in fifteen equal semi-annual installments.
There is an "early participation" fee for banks that commit funds ear-
lier. The agreement also contains "cross default" events linked to several
agreements between the lenders and Banco Central.
Onlending has not been included within this agreement. 73
The purpose of the Trade Credit and Deposit Facility is to provide
credit to entities involved in export and import transactions. It is also a
"syndicated loan" with a term of four years.
C. ALTERNATIVE PARTICIPATION INSTRUMENTS
Within the "menu of options" system followed in the renegotiations,
Part V-Section F of the Financing Plan describes several aspects of the
"Alternative Participation Instruments." The purpose of issuing these
bonds is to reduce the number of banks participating in the syndicated
agreements, since "the Exchangeable Debt exchanged by any bank for
73. Onlending is a mechanism by which the borrower (a public agency) is able to use the
borrowed funds by transferring then to the private sector of the country. The objective is
to use the "new money" in the development of investment capacity and exports. Usually,
this is a clause in the rescheduling and refinancing agreements between lenders and bor-
rowers. See Mudge, supra note 43, at 847; see also CAMARA DE DISPUTADOS DE LA NACION,
DIARIO DE SESIONES, May 12 y 13 de 1987, at 7856; ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: 1984-85 FI-
NANCING PLAN IV-A-2.
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Alternative Participation Instruments (APIs) will not be included in the
Base Date Debt ... of such bank." At the same time, these "exit bonds"
amount to an acquittal of the debt exchanged, since the interest rates
payable are fixed at 4 percent and the repayment begins in thirteen years,
following a twelve-year grace period. 74
"Base Date Debt" is the concept used to delimit the group of lenders
that have to participate in the Term Credit Agreement (U.S. $1.5 billion).
On that basis, all banks that are qualified as holders of "base date debt"
are syndicated in the new loan.
The opportunity for second-tier banks to avoid syndication lies in the
ability of such banks to subscribe to APIs. This is done by means of an
agreement between Banco Central, the Republic of Argentina, and each
bank that chooses to convert debt for APIs. "[T]he Republic of Argentina
will covenant that neither the APIs nor the Exchangeable Debt exchanged
for them will be considered as part of a bank's base for the purpose of
new money requests under concerted lending programs for 1987 or in the
future." However, the subscription is limited to U.S. $5 million for each
bank. The titles received are transferable in accordance with the regu-
lations in force in each country governing "bearer" titles.
Apart from the above, a "Trade Credit Maintenance Facility" and a
"Stand-By Money Market Facility" were created and the 1983 and 1985
Term Credit Agreements, as well as the 1985 Trade Credit and Deposit
Facility, were amended.
VII. Capitalization of External Debt
Since 1983-1984, creditor banks have established a "grey" market in
the cross-border loan obligations of several developing countries in order
to achieve a less risk-concentrated country debt exposure in their port-
folio. Debtors have been more willing to instrument their loans by means
of bonds and, in some cases, to capitalize their debt. 75
74. The purpose of this option was, as explained, to simplify negotiations and to obtain
certain reductions of interest and improvement of payment conditions. Unfortunately, banks
have not resorted to this opportunity and prefer to retain their original rights even if as a
result they must participate in new lending.
75. Among the countries that have established mechanisms for the "swapping" of external
debt into equity or local currency are Mexico in 1985, Chile in 1985, Philippines in 1986,
Ecuador in 1987, and Argentina with two programs, one in 1984 and a recent one in 1987.
As to the ways in which debt swapping should take place, Martine Guerguil classifies the
proposals into three major groups. The first holds that the conversion of debt should be
tied to prevailing market forces, avoiding all government intervention. The real possibilities
of payment and true value of each debt would result. Within this group some authors suggest
"capitalizing" debt. The capital could be either (a) stock of private companies of the debtor
nation (Allan Meltzer), or (b) "exchange participation notes," issued by the debtor country's
central bank, which would grant rights to payments determined as a proportion of the
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Initially, the banks' main objective in their debt conversion programs
was that they obtain "negative pledge" clauses with each loan. These
clauses limit the sovereign's ability to incur future debt that will rank
ahead of the obligations governed by the negotiation agreement." 76 This
has been overcome in subsequent renegotiations and programs have been
organized with the banks' approval. 77 On the other hand, the debtors
were fearful that by converting debt into local currency the resulting
expansion in the money supply would immediately accelerate the econ-
omy, thus preventing them from achieving the inflation and fiscal deficit
goals required by the IMF.78 This has been avoided by limiting the amount
of debt converted monthly to a fixed amount that does not produce sharp
changes in the money supply.
There are essentially two procedures that have been implemented. One
is "redenomination," the conversion of debt into local currency or titles
country's foreign currency total inflow (Bailey). As a proposal, it is better linked to the
amortization aspect of the debt. A second group of proposals relies on collective action by
all interested parties: the debtors, the banks, and an international organization. The banks
would reduce their exposure in unreliable credits by receiving safer credits in exchange. In
the process they would have to make certain accounting adjustments to assume partial
losses. On the other hand, debtors would have to initiate adjustment policies. The role of
the international organization would be to act as broker, and the industrialized nations would
offer their guaranty to the new credits. Within this group, some suggest the creation of
"international bonds," which would be swapped for debt titles at below par value. Others
merely require collective official guaranty on the outstanding debt, which would make
negotiations between debtors and banks more relaxed. Finally, another suggestion indicates
that debtors should unilaterally convert all debt into bonds. Dornbusch, under these lines,
elaborated a plan for the Brazilian debt. See Guerguil, supra note 46, at 272.
76. See Hurlock, Advising Sovereign Clients on the Renegotiation of their External In-
debtedness, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (1984); Wickersham, Problems of Documen-
tation in Rescheduling of Sovereign Bank Debt, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, supra
note 6, at 120-21; Oechsli, supra note 4, at 321. This clause would be drafted in terms near
to these: "The debtor ensures at all times that the obligations contracted under this restruc-
turing agreement will, unconditionally, rank at least pari passu with any other External
Indebtedness not or in any future moment outstanding." See also Carreau, Le Droit Inter-
national EOconomique, in DOCUMENTS D'tTUDES-DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (1985).
Article XI Clause pari passu:
L'ouverture de crddit consentie par ledit contrat prendra rang pari passu avec
toute dette de I'Emprunteur et notamment toute (mission obligatoire ou op-
dration realisde sur le marche international de m6me nature que celle prdvue
audit contrat, faite par I'Emprunteur apres la signature des prdsentes, sauf
accord des Banques participantes.
L'Emprunteur s'engage a ne pas c~der, assumer ou souffrir que subsiste
toute suretd sur un quelconque de ses actifs, prsents ou futurs, en garantie
de toute dette contractde dans le cadre des hypotheses prdvues a I'alinda
prdcddent, sans prendre toute disposition utile pour que le credit prevu aux
pr(sentes soit garanti par une telle surete au meme rang que cette autre dette.
77. See Circular No. I I1, Series of 1986, Program for the Conversion of Philippine Ex-
ternal Debt into Equity Investments, Central Bank of the Philippines, chapter 1 section 2.
78. See Global Debt-the Equity Solution, in EUROMONEY-A SUPPLEMENT TO EURO-
MONEY AND CORPORATE FINANCE 10, 81 (Jan. 1988).
FALL 1988
664 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
payable in local currency that allows the country to arrange investment
programs and increase the amount of local capital. The second system,
"capitalization," converts debt into stock of either public or private en-
terprises. The latter has the advantage of avoiding inflationary pressures.
It may, however, lead to a mere transfer of existing capital from local
owners into foreign hands without improving the country's productive
capacity.
The Argentine program for the conversion of external debt into local
currency can be defined as a redenomination mechanism. The program's
purpose is to perform investment projects in the private sector and it aims
at increasing the country's export capacity. The initial program will be
discussed, as well as the main modifications to which it was subjected
during the month of October 1987. 79
The procedure has two stages. The first involves the creditor's presen-
tation of an investment project, which must be declared eligible by the
Ministry of Finance according to both formal rules and its compatibility
with the overall program's aims. Once declared eligible, the second step
involves the proper exchange of the debt. The potential investor presents
a conversion request to Banco Central de la Republica Argentina in order
to obtain the needed funds in local currency. The funds are obtained by
converting debt titles the creditor owns. Since there is a limited quota of
convertible debt, bidding takes place in order to determine which tenders
are more advantageous. The ones chosen will be able to convert the
external debt titles into local currency and to apply the funds received to
the performance of investment projects previously approved.
The essential requirements with which an investor must comply are
as follows: (I) the presentation of external obligations considered con-
vertible; 80 (2) entry of Matching Funds; (3) submission of a conversion
request and a schedule when the investment project exceeds U.S. $2.5
million; and (4) provision for adequate guarantees.
The financial scheme on which the program's success depends is based
on the belief that the investor will be attracted by the possibility of con-
verting his titles, which were obtained in the "grey" market of foreign
debt bonds at a discount, in order to receive local currency for the con-
verted titles at their face value. The greater the discount the titles suffer
in the market, the higher the profit the investor will receive when those
titles are converted at the official currency rate in Buenos Aires. Most
programs followed by other countries do not convert the titles at face
79. See BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA, COMUNICACION 'A' 1109 (27 de
Octubre de 1987) and Anexo-Programs de Conversion de Deuda Publica Externa.
80. This includes most obligations of the public sector, excluding short-term commercial
debt and credits granted or guaranteed by non-Argentine official agencies.
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value. Instead they do so at a discount that is smaller than the one pre-
vailing in the market. 8'
For example, conversion would be financially attractive if
D + MF = MV + MF' where: D is the nominal amount of convertible
debt in the local currency at the official currency rate; MF are the con-
verted Matching Funds in local currency at the official currency rate; MV
is the market value of the external obligations converted at the parallel
market; 82 and MF' is the equivalent of the Matching Funds in local cur-
rency if converted at the parallel market.
This gain had its counterpart in the investor's obligation to bring into
the country an amount of "fresh" capital at least equivalent to the nominal
amount of debt converted. These "Matching Funds" are expected to be
disbursed on or after May 1, 1987, and will account for 100 percent or 50
percent of each dollar according to its origin. The Matching Funds are
100 percent if: (a) the funds are capital investment not to be redeemed or
distributed for the minimum years provided for by the Argentine foreign
investment law; (b) the funds were long-term private source financing with
a minimum term of six years and a minimum grace period of four years;
or (c) the par value of BONEX 83 is purchased in U.S. dollars in the
primary market from Banco Central at 0.96 par value, which Banco Cen-
tral generally intends to make available. Of each dollar only fifty cents
would qualify as Matching Funds if they were: (a) project loans disbursed
by the International Finance Corporation and the International Investment
Corporation; or (b) funds disbursed in accordance with generally appli-
cable government regulations outside of Argentina with a term of no less
than eighteen months by multilateral or official non-Argentine entities (or
by any person in association with such entities) for the purchase of goods
or services that have been imported into Argentina; or (c) funds allocated
from the Investment Fund in accordance with the requirements of that
Fund, or unloaned funds with a minimum term equal to that required
under the Investment Fund (such loaned funds to count against the rel-
evant lending quota).84
81. As of November 1987, the quotes for public debt titles in the secondary market were
approximately 50-53 percent for Chile, 48-52 percent for Mexico. 55-60 percent for the
Philippines and 33-37 percent for Argentina (all of their par value). See EUROMONEY, Supra
note 78 at 26-27.
82. In Argentina the exchange rates were pegged to the U.S. dollar until October 1987,
and the market was controlled by the government. There was a parallel market, which,
although illegal, operates and was taken into account by the monetary authorities in their
regulation of the monetary supply and the determination of the exchange rates.
83. These are External Bonds of the Argentine Republic, a category of negotiable in-
struments issued by the Argentine Government.
84. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: 1987 FINANCIAL PLAN part I1, annex 3 (April 24, 1987).
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On the whole this requirement was considered to be excessively re-
strictive. The reaction was, therefore, initially cold on the part of the
banking community. An additional disadvantage to which objections were
raised was the conversion of the debt and Matching Funds at the official
exchange rate which is, at times, up to 40 percent lower than that of the
parallel market. Both aspects have been modified. Concerning the latter,
the foreign currency market has been deregulated. A unified market for
foreign currency was established in October 1987, with no entry and exit
restrictions. In relation to the former, the one-to-one requirement has
been dropped. The new ratio of extra funds accepted by the Argentine
Government is 70 percent to 30 percent. In addition, the authorities will
allow the 30 percent to be in Australes (the local currency), and not
exclusively in foreign currency obtained in foreign markets.
As to the conversion guarantee, it must be constituted before the bid
takes place, either by means of a deposit or of a bank bail, both in an
amount equal to 1 percent of the convertible debt. If the Matching Funds
are for projects which exceed U.S. $1 million, after the bid their entry
can be secured by a guarantee similar to the previous one, but in an
amount equal to 3 percent per year of the balance of additional funds that
remain to be converted. That guarantee will be proportionally forfeited
if the conversions do not take place according to the schedule that was
presented and approved in the bidding process.
The conversion request that complied with the formal requirements was
to be graded according to the formula: Grade = F/D, where F = Matching
Funds and D = Convertible Debt. The greater the additional capital, the
higher the grade the request would receive. The conversions were to be
on this basis. This aspect has been modified as well. As of February 1988,
the decisive factor in the second stage is now "the percentage of reduction
on the nominal value of the debt paper that the project agrees to accept
in converting the debt into Australes," or discount. If, however, the total
of tenders does not cover the bimonthly quota, all will be approved. 85
The attractiveness of this scheme is the favorable exchange rate it offers.
As of November 1987, quotes for Argentine public debt paper in the
secondary market were 33-37 percent of face value. The scheme grants
the investor the possibility of obtaining an effective exchange rate of 100
percent or higher.
An investor may, after the conversion is decided, solicit the conversion
of the interest that is due at the time of the conversion. Both interest and
principal are to be deposited in a local intervening bank. The effect of
the deposit is to extinguish the external obligation that has been converted.
The funds deposited are freed according to: (I) the completion of the
85. See EUROMONEY, supra note 78, at 82.
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different stages of the investment project for which they were approved
by the intervening authority; (2) the entry of the Matching Funds ac-
cording to the initial arrangement; and (3) compliance with the specified
ratio between Matching Funds entered and converted funds freed. As
each stage is performed, the guarantees for the conversion of debt and
for the entry of Matching Funds (if they exist) will be proportionally
reduced.
Finally, the program contemplates the participation of a local interven-
ing bank that acts as a supervisor of the execution of the project. That
bank is responsible to Banco Central for keeping a file for each investment
project. In case of nonperformance by the investor, sanctions may amount
to the loss of the guarantees and of the right to continue with the project
or the conversion, depending on the case. Justifications may be considered
by the authorities, who as a whole will follow the general principles con-
tained in the Argentine Republic 1987 Financial Plan in the interpretation
of these regulations.
VIII. Conclusion
Some essential aspects of the Argentine external debt process have
been described. Others have been omitted for reasons of brevity, but are
certainly relevant (i.e., capital flight, rescheduling with the Paris Club,
and co-financing).
Argentina's case is not unique among Third World countries. Due to
its social and economic characteristics, however, its chances of devel-
opment should be greater than those of many other lesser developed
countries. The debt, as it stands today, is a serious impediment to any
possible economic growth and, at the same time, threatens the political
stability of the newly established democratic government. The traditional
powers of sovereign nations under classical international law-such as
the freedom to elect a social, cultural, and economic system-have been
severely undercut by the present restriction on the use of the country's
resources.
Trade conditions are an essential part of possible improvement. All the
industrialized countries must respond to the need for increasing imports
from lesser developed countries, whose products have been largely ex-
cluded from the benefits of free trade and comparative advantage. Until
more adequate solutions are achieved, and while countries are forced to
mortgage their future, there seems to be little chance of promoting "social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 86
86. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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